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The  paper  presents  an  analysis  of  lay  political  reasoning  on  the  UK  EU  referendum  drawing  
on  data  from  nine  focus  groups  conducted  in  England  in  the  few  weeks  preceding  the  vote.  
Participants  were  from  across  the  political  spectrum  and  with  varied  voting  intentions  in  the  
upcoming  referendum  (Remain,  Leave  and  some  undecided).  A  rhetorical  analysis  of  the  
data  showed  that  the  ideological  dilemma  of  nationalism  (between  safeguarding  national  
distinctiveness  and  sovereignty,  on  the  one  hand,  and  valuing  international  collaboration  
and  exchange,  on  the  other  hand)  was  a  key  organising  principle  in  participants’  accounts,  as  
was  the  distinction  between  reason  and  bias.  Participants  intending  to  vote  Leave  as  well  as  
Remain  engaged  with  both  sides  of  the  nationalism  dilemma,  seeking  to  present  themselves  
as  both  open  to  cosmopolitan  values  and  as  concerned  about  preserving  national  
sovereignty.  Further,  the  liberal  distinction  between  reason  and  bias  in  the  data  often  took  
the  form  of  a  distinction  between  politics  (as  biased  and  corrupt)  and  the  economy  (as  
rational),  thus  de-­‐politicising  the  economy  as  a  neutral  and  post-­‐ideological  sphere.  The  
implications  of  these  findings  for  contemporary  politics  are  discussed.  
Keywords:  Brexit;  nationalism;  ideological  dilemmas;  European  Union;  everyday  
neoliberalism;  EU  referendum  
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The  UK  Brexit  vote       
On  23  June  2016,  following  a  heated  campaign  period  that  polarised  the  public,  52%  of  
British  voters  opted  for  ‘Brexit’  while  a  very  significant  minority  of  48%  opted  for  ‘Remain’  in  
the  European  Union.  Despite  the  UK’s  historical  Euroscepticism,  this  was  something  of  a  
surprise,  given  that  all  major  British  political  parties  (apart  from  the  UK  Independence  Party,  
UKIP)  predominantly  supported  remaining  in  the  EU.    
At  one  level,  the  referendum  result  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  socio-­‐demographic  factors.  
The  Leave  vote  was  greater  among  the  more  economically  disadvantaged  working  classes  
and  the  less  educated,  older  and  ‘whiter’  voters  (Goodwin  &  Heath,  2016;  Swales,  2016).  
These  findings  have  been  described  in  terms  of  a  ‘left-­‐behind’  narrative  (Goodwin  &  Heath,  
2016),  which  suggests  that  Leave  voters  are  the  so-­‐called  ‘left  behind’,  or  ‘losers  of  
globalisation’,  who  have  been  particularly  hit  by  the  effects  of  the  2008  financial  crisis  and  
by  subsequent  austerity  policies.  However,  the  narrow  use  of  this  explanatory  framework  
has  been  critiqued  for  patronising  the  working  classes  (Mckenzie,  2017)  and  for  placing  too  
much  emphasis  on  the  white  working  classes  to  the  exclusion  of  other  ethnic  groups  
(Bhambra,  2017).  Further  analyses  also  show  that  the  Leave  vote  was  wider,  including  older  
working  classes,  economically  deprived  voters  with  anti-­‐immigration  views,  but  also  more  
affluent  Eurosceptics  (Swales,  2016).  
The  above  suggests  that  support  for  Brexit  cannot  be  easily  explained  by  simple  schemas  
nor  by  traditional  political  cleavages.  It  has  been  observed,  for  example,  that  the  
referendum  result  does  not  fit  established  political  divisions,  but  it  can  be  better  explained  
in  terms  of  social  values.  Swales  (2016)  found  that  Leave  voters  were  more  likely  to  be  
authoritarian  than  libertarian  (see  also  Peitz,  Dhont  &  Seyd,  this  issue)  and  anti-­‐welfare  than  
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pro-­‐welfare,  while  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  left-­‐wing  and  right-­‐wing  
orientation.  In  light  of  these  cultural-­‐political  shifts,  it  has  been  suggested  that  politics  are  
better  understood  through  the  study  of  cultural  values  rather  than  structural  cleavages  
(Kriesi,  2010).    
In  this  paper,  we  argue  that  in  order  to  study  these  new  and  emerging  ideological  
constellations,  we  need  a  bottom-­‐up  approach.  This  enables  us  to  move  beyond  a  narrow  
‘culture  wars’  explanatory  schema  which  has  too  often  been  used  to  account  for  recent  
unanticipated  political  events  in  the  West,  such  as  Brexit  (Koch,  2017).  We  also  challenge  
simplistic  and  polarising  narratives  of  contemporary  politics,  which  divide  citizens  into  neat  
either/or  categories.  This  paper  provides  instead  a  qualitative  in-­‐depth  analysis  of  everyday  
ideologies  in  order  to  shed  light  on  this  changing  political  landscape  from  the  perspectives  
of  citizens  themselves.  This  is  particularly  important  in  today’s  increasingly  populist  politics  
whereby  the  trope  of  ‘the  people’  has  become  a  powerful  rhetorical  tool  used  by  politicians  
claiming  to  speak  on  behalf  of  ‘ordinary’  citizens.    
To  achieve  an  in-­‐depth  understanding  of  common-­‐sense  views  about  the  EU  referendum  
and  Brexit,  we  use  the  theoretical  framework  of  rhetorical  psychology  which  studies  lay  
political  thinking  as  a  complex  and  dilemmatic  practice  (Billig,  1987;  Billig,  Condor,  Edwards,  
Gane,  Middleton,  &  Radley,  1988;  see  also  Mahendran’s  dialogical  approach  in  this  issue).  In  
what  follows,  we  explain  our  theoretical  rationale,  before  presenting  our  methods  and  
findings.  
Everyday  ideologies    
In  this  paper  we  explore  lay  understandings  of  the  EU  referendum  in  the  UK.  We  see  these  
lay  understandings  as  being  is  grounded  in  ideological  systems  and  cultural  traditions.  There  
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are  different  ways  of  conceptualising  ideology  in  psychology  (see  Curtis  &  Hassing  Nielsen,  
this  issue).  Here,  we  draw  on  work  from  the  ideological  dilemmas  tradition  in  discursive  and  
rhetorical  psychology  (Billig  et  al.,  1988).  The  ideological  dilemmas  approach  bridges  what  is  
considered  ‘internal’  (e.g.  attitudes  and  beliefs)  and  what  is  considered  ‘external’  (e.g.  
ideologies  and  cultural  traditions)  to  the  individual.  This  approach  sees  ideology  as  a  cultural  
resource  (at  the  more  macro  level)  which  is  drawn  upon  and  used  in  everyday  interactions  
(at  the  more  micro  level).  This  social  psychological  approach  is  distinct  from  more  
mainstream  psychological  approaches  (which  focus  on  the  individual  level,  e.g.  attitudes)  
and  from  traditional  Marxist  approaches  on  ideology  (which  broadly  see  ideology  as  an  
external  system  of  beliefs  that  exists  above  and  beyond  popular  common-­‐sense).  Billig  et  al.  
(1988)  refer  to  this  latter  conception  of  ideology  as  ‘intellectual  ideology’  to  differentiate  it  
from  ‘everyday’  or  ‘lived  ideology’.  While  intellectual  ideology  is  produced  by  ‘expert  
thinkers’,  from  philosophy,  politics,  religion  and  other  domains  of  intellectual  production,  
lived  ideology  is  a  non-­‐formalized  cultural  system  of  knowledge  that  is  actively  drawn  upon  
and  negotiated  in  everyday  interactions.  This  is  an  understanding  of  ‘ideology  in  process’  
(Haste,  2004,  p.  415,  italics  in  original),  that  is,  ideology  as  a  cultural  resource  that  is  actively  
used  to  make  sense  of  and  engage  with  the  social  world.  
The  ideological  dilemmas  approach  challenges  the  idea  that  lay  thinking  is  neutral  and  a-­‐
political.  On  the  contrary,  it  brings  to  the  forefront  of  social  psychological  analysis  the  
politics  of  everyday  sense-­‐making.  Further,  as  alluded  by  the  term  ‘dilemma’,  this  approach  
suggests  that  lay  thinking  is  not  internally  consistent  but  draws  on  a  diverse  range  of  values  
and  ideological  themes  which  may  be  in  tension  with  each  other.  The  dilemmas  of  everyday  
ideologies  provide  people  with  the  seeds  for  arguing,  which  is  the  foundation  of  thinking  
itself  (Billig,  1987).    
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Work  in  this  field  has  studied  a  range  of  ideological  dilemmas.  Most  relevant  for  this  paper,  
given  its  focus  on  Europe  and  the  UK,  is  Billig’s  (1995)  work  on  nationalism.  Billig  has  shown  
that  the  ideology  of  nationalism  is  not  simply  an  extreme  ethnocentric  ideological  position.  
On  the  contrary,  nationalism  contains  within  it  both  an  inward  and  an  outward  looking  
perspective.  It  requires  that  we  see  our  nation  as  distinct,  but  also  that  we  see  it  as  part  of  
an  international  system  of  nation-­‐states.  So,  any  instance  of  ‘flagging  the  nation’  is  also  an  
instance  of  reproducing  the  world  of  nations  as  a  natural  state  of  affairs.  Nationalism  is  done  
in  ‘banal’  practices,  such  as  everyday  language  use.  For  example,  words  such  as  ‘us’,  ‘our’  
and  ‘here’  can  invoke  and  reproduce  an  implicit  national  frame  of  reference.  Further,  
nationalism  is  not  a  one-­‐dimensional  ideological  theme,  but  it  contains  within  it  the  seeds  
for  reflection  and  debate.  Condor  (2000)  has  showed,  for  example,  that  English  
interviewees,  while  accepting  national  categorisation  through  banal  national  referents  (e.g.  
‘we’,  ‘they’,  ‘here’),  also  questioned  the  legitimacy  of  national  categorisation  by  treating  talk  
about  ‘this  country’  as  potentially  xenophobic.    
Another  important  focus  of  work  in  the  ideological  dilemmas  tradition  has  been  the  liberal  
dilemma  between  reason  and  prejudice,  e.g.  against  migrants.  This  dilemma  has  featured  in  
discussions  about  Brexit  in  the  UK,  particularly  about  whether  Brexit  is  associated  with  anti-­‐
immigration  sentiments.  This  is  a  commonly  held  view,  especially  in  Remain-­‐supporting  
accounts,  but  (as  we  will  also  show)  it  is  also  strongly  resisted.  This  is  due  to  the  norm  
against  prejudice.  According  to  Billig  et  al.  (1988),  this  norm  is  anchored  in  the  ideology  of  
liberalism  which  elevates  the  value  of  individual  reason  against  the  irrationality  of  biased  or  
prejudiced  thinking.  The  norm  against  prejudice  requires  that  people  do  not  judge  others  on  
the  basis  of  ethnic  or  racial  categorisations,  but  that  they  ground  their  assessments  in  logic  
and  reason.  In  this  context,  the  expression  of  views  that  can  be  heard  as  prejudiced  or  racist  
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(e.g.  against  immigration)  raises  accountability  concerns  for  speakers  (see  also  discussion  of  
Condor,  2000,  above).  As  has  been  shown  in  previous  research  on  talk  about  immigration  
(e.g.  Andreouli,  Greenland  &  Howarth,  2016;  Figgou  &  Condor,  2006;  Goodman,  2010),  
people  use  rhetorical  strategies  to  ‘dodge  the  identity  of  prejudice’  (Wetherell  &  Potter,  
1992).  For  instance,  people  may  employ  disclaimers  in  their  talk  about  immigration  (e.g.  ‘I’m  
not  racist  but),  or  they  may  try  to  deracialise  arguments  against  immigration  (see  
Augoustinos  &  Every,  2007  for  an  overview).  
In  the  current  neoliberal  ideological  context  (Harvey,  2005),  the  ideological  dilemma  of  
reason/prejudice  can  be  said  to  take  on  a  new  form  that  prioritises  the  economy  and  
naturalises  the  ‘logic  of  the  market’  as  free  from  bias.  Contemporary  Western  societies  have  
been  described  as  ‘econocracies’,  that  is  as  societies  where  ‘political  goals  are  defined  in  
terms  of  their  effect  on  the  economy,  which  is  believed  to  be  a  distinct  system  with  its  own  
logic  that  requires  experts  to  manage  it’  (Moran,  Ward-­‐Perkins  &  Earle,  2016).  Importantly,  
in  these  econocracies,  the  ‘logic  of  the  market’  does  not  only  define  political  decision  
making;  it  also  describes  more  micro-­‐level  discursive  practices  (Davis,  2016).  Hall  and  O’Shea  
(2015)  have  described  this  in  terms  of  a  neoliberal  common-­‐sense,  where  self-­‐interest  and  
economic  cost-­‐benefit  calculations  are  taken  as  a  natural,  and  unbiased,  way  of  
understanding  the  world.  In  our  analysis  in  this  paper,  we  suggest  that  the  liberal  dilemma  
between  reason  and  prejudice/bias  is  rearticulated  under  neoliberalism,  so  that  reason  is  
associated  with  the  market  and  bias  is  associated  with  non-­‐market  driven  spheres  of  activity  
(such  as  politics,  as  we  discuss  below).  
Our  study  explores  how  focus  group  participants  reasoned  about  the  EU  referendum  just  
days  before  casting  their  vote.  In  light  of  the  discussion  above,  we  focus  specifically  on  the  
7  
  
ways  that  participants  navigated  the  dilemma  between  national  particularism  and  
internationalism  and  the  dilemma  between  reason  and  bias.    
Method  
Data  collection  and  participants  
Our  aim  in  this  study  has  not  been  to  generalise  our  findings  to  the  larger  population  but  to  
explore  in  depth  a  variety  of  views  on  the  EU  referendum.  Participants  for  the  focus  groups  
were  selected  so  as  to  capture  a  range  of  representations  on  this  issue.  We  recruited  
participants  from  across  England  (other  regions  of  the  UK  were  excluded,  as  we  did  not  
want  to  delve  into  UK  constitutional  issues),  who  were  supporters  of  the  main  political  
parties  (Conservative,  Labour,  Green,  Liberal  Democrat  and  UKIP),  and  who  intended  to  vote  
both  Leave  and  Remain.  We  also  sought  to  have  a  balance  in  terms  of  age,  gender  and  
socioeconomic  background.  Age,  social  and  educational  background  and  party  affiliation  
were  all  factors  that,  at  the  time,  were  expected  to  influence  the  vote  (Curtice,  2015),  and  
they  were  indeed  associated  with  voting  patterns  in  following  analyses  (Goodwin  &  Heath,  
2016;  Swales,  2016).  Details  of  the  participants  in  each  focus  group  are  presented  in  Table  1.  













1   1M   B   20   London   Conservative   Leave  
1     4         2F,  2M   B   50-­‐
60  





2     4   2F,  2M   A/  B     30-­‐
40  
London     Green                                
/  Labour    
Remain  
3     6   3F,  3M   B/C   30-­‐
45  
Kent   Conservative    
  
3  Remain,  2  
Leave,  1  
Undecided  
4     2     2F   A   40-­‐
60  
London   Conservative   Remain  
5     4   3M   C/  D     40-­‐
50  
Hertfordshire   UKIP   Leave  
6     3         2F,  1M   C/D   30-­‐
40  
Hertfordshire   Labour     Leave  
7     3       3F   B   30-­‐
40  
London   Labour     Remain  
8     6   6M   C/D   30-­‐
55  
London   Conservative  
/Labour  
2  Remain,  2  
Leave,  2  
Undecided  
9     6   4F,  2M   B/C   40-­‐
70  




Nine  focus  groups  with  thirty-­‐eight  participants  in  total  were  conducted.  One  pilot  interview  
was  also  conducted  to  test  the  topic  guide.  The  topic  guide  was  semi-­‐structured,  and  it  
contained  questions  and  prompts  on  the  meanings  of  Europe  and  on  the  UK’s  relationship  
with  the  EU  and  the  upcoming  referendum.  At  the  beginning  of  each  focus  group  
participants  were  asked  to  complete  individually  a  word  association  task  with  the  term  
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‘European’.  This  served  as  a  prompt  to  start  the  discussion.  Participants  were  also  asked  to  
complete  a  brief  questionnaire  at  the  end  of  each  focus  group,  where  they  recorded  socio-­‐
demographic  data,  their  party  affiliation,  and  their  intention  to  vote  in  the  referendum.    
The  focus  groups  were  all  conducted  by  a  female  English  interviewer,  the  second  author  of  
this  paper.  They  lasted  from  around  45  minutes  to  about  1  hour  and  40  minutes.  They  were  
all  conducted  in  June  2016,  with  the  last  one  taking  place  two  days  before  the  vote.  The  
focus  groups  varied  in  their  size  (the  largest  consisted  of  six  participants  and  the  smallest  
consisted  of  two  participants)  due  to  participants  withdrawing  at  the  last  minute.    
Analytic  approach  
We  first  conducted  a  thematic  analysis  to  map  the  semantic  content  of  the  focus  groups.  
We  coded  our  transcribed  data  using  a  hierarchical  scheme  of  themes  and  sub-­‐themes  
(Attride-­‐Stirling,  2001).  With  this  analysis,  we  identified  two  interrelated  thematic  networks  
in  our  data.  The  first  was  structured  around  the  distinction  between  nationalism  and  
internationalism.  These  global  themes  were  present  in  all  focus  groups  and  grounded  ideas  
of  smaller  sub-­‐themes  (such  as  sovereignty).  Our  second  thematic  network  was  structured  
around  three  global  themes:  the  economy,  politics  and  culture/identity,  which  functioned  as  
the  lenses  through  which  issues  around  the  referendum  were  discussed.  For  example,  
immigration  could  be  discussed  in  terms  of  Britain  being  able  to  control  its  own  borders  as  a  
sovereign  nation  (political  aspect),  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  the  UK  economy  (economic  
aspect)  and/or  in  terms  of  its  impact  on  Britain’s  culture.  The  theme  of  culture  was  much  
less  prominent  in  the  data  compared  to  politics  and  the  economy  and  it  is  not  explored  in  
this  paper  (see  Andreouli,  2018,  for  a  discussion  of  this  theme).  
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Following  this  thematic  overview,  we  proceeded  to  conduct  a  more  detailed  rhetorical  
analysis  of  these  themes.  In  line  with  a  rhetorical-­‐discursive  approach  (Billig,  1987;  Billig  et  
al.,  1988;  Wetherell  &  Potter,  1992),  we  were  interested  in  studying  both  the  specific  
argumentative  lines  and  the  cultural  common-­‐places  that  grounded  participants’  talk.  We  
did  this  by  (i)  examining  the  micro-­‐context  of  each  focus  group,  looking  particularly  at  issues  
of  identity  management  and  accountability  within  each  group.  We  also  (ii)  examined  the  
macro-­‐context  of  talk,  that  is,  the  broader  cultural  and  ideological  resources  in  which  
discursive  interactions  are  anchored  using  the  framework  of  ideological  dilemmas  (Billig  et  
al.,  1988).  
Analysis    
Our  analysis  shows  that  participants’  accounts  were  grounded  in  the  ideological  dilemma  
between  national  particularism  and  internationalism,  and  also  in  the  ideological  dilemma  
between  reason  and  bias,  which,  in  the  data,  was  reconfigured  in  terms  of  an  opposition  
between  ‘biased  politics’  and  ‘neutral  economy’.  Below  we  present  our  findings  in  detail.  
Nationalism  and  internationalism     
In  the  accounts  of  participants,  the  internationalist  pole  of  the  nationalism  dilemma  (Billig,  
1995)  took  the  form  of  cosmopolitan  values,  as  has  been  shown  in  other  qualitative  
research  on  representations  of  Europe  (Andreouli  &  Howarth,  2018),  in  support  of  cultural  
diversity,  international  collaboration,  peace  and  human  rights.  Unsurprisingly,  this  type  of  




Jenny:  There's  like,  I  guess,  like  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  and  the  
European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  and,  I  mean,  I  personally  think  it's  fabulous,  and  its  
judgements  are  brilliant.  It's  kind  of  like,  I  see  it  as  a  kind  of  collective  better  wisdom  
that  can  override  the  discrimination  of  certain  countries.  So  some  of  the  cases  like,  for  
example,  the  UK  had  with  not  wanting  to  allow  gay  people  in  the  Army  -­‐  even  though  
I'm  not  a  big  fan  of  the  Army,  obviously  -­‐  but  discrimination  against  gay  people  -­‐  and  
they  were  saying  that  you  know,  using  religious  arguments,  and  that  it  would  be  too  
much  of  a  distraction  for  the  other  men,  and  it  took  it  going  all  the  way  to  the  
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  to  kind  of  overrule  it  and  say,  'no,  you  are  being  
ridiculous’,  you  know,  and  not  allowing  countries  to  discriminate  like  that,  by  having  
this  kind  of  overarching  sensibility  and  more  sensible  decisions,  so  countries  can't  just  
get  away  with  discriminatory  things?  
Lisa:    Yes,  so  in  that  vein,  similarly  I  would  say,  for  me,  like,  I  feel  safer  being  a  part  of  
Europe,  because  I  feel  like  it  balances  -­‐  well,  not  just  us,  but  all  countries,  it's  a  
balance,  and  whatever  extreme  perspective  you're  going  to  invite,  it's  going  to  balance  
from  all  political  perspectives.  (FG2)  
  
In  the  above  extract,  international  collaboration  is  presented  as  counterbalancing  the  bias  
and  discrimination  that  comes  from  national  politics.  Jenny  uses  the  specific  example  of  not  
allowing  gay  people  in  the  British  Army  which  was  overruled  by  the  European  Court  of  
Human  Rights.  This  is  cast  by  Jenny  as  discrimination  against  gay  people  on  the  basis  of  
religious  arguments.  Lisa  agrees  with  this  assessment  and  argues  that  being  part  of  Europe  
is  safer  because  it  balances  out  extreme  perspectives.  The  EU  is  constructed  here  as  a  
moderating  force  that  counters  instances  of  intolerance  that  are  found  in  national  politics.  
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This  internationalist  argumentative  line  is  nonetheless  still  inscribed  within  an  ideological  
frame  which  sees  nation-­‐states  as  naturally  part  of  a  world  of  nations  (Billig,  1995).  While  
the  value  of  diversity  and  international  cooperation  is  pronounced  in  the  extract,  this  basic  
ideological  assumption  is  not  challenged.  
The  particularistic  pole  of  the  nationalism  ideological  dilemma  in  our  data  had  to  do  with  
arguments  about  enhancing  national  sovereignty,  and  it  was  very  salient  in  Leave-­‐
supporting  accounts.  Sovereignty  was  one  of  the  key  issues  for  determining  people’s  EU  
Referendum  position,  particularly  among  those  who  voted  Leave  (Swales,  2016),  and  it  has  
been  discussed  as  today’s  central  political  demand  in  the  context  of  a  general  dissatisfaction  
with  globalisation  (Gerbaudo,  2017).  This  ideological  position  took  different  forms  in  our  
data.  It  could  take  the  form  of  an  economic  argument  (for  example,  protecting  national  
interests  over  European  ones  in  terms  of  trade  agreements  and  labour  mobility).  It  could  
also  take  the  form  of  an  identity  and  culture-­‐based  argument  –  this  primarily  was  about  
limiting  immigration,  which  was  sometimes  seen  as  a  cultural  threat.  The  sovereignty  
argument  could  also  relate  more  specifically  to  the  political  sphere,  i.e.  leaving  the  EU  would  
allow  the  UK  to  make  its  own  laws.  Extract  2  is  an  illustration  of  this  latter  argumentative  
line  (see  also  Andreouli,  Kaposi  &  Stenner,  2018).  
Extract  2  
Nicole:  That’s  what  I  was  going  to  say.    So,  I  think  the  whole  thing  with  poverty  or,  you  
know,  perceived  poverty  in  this  country  and  the  people  not  going  to  work  and  getting  
off  the  government,  isn’t  it  something  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the  EU  dictates  to  us  
about  our  actual  policies  like  that?  
Interviewer:  But  do  you  think  they  do  dictate?  
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Scott:  About  what  policies?  
Nicole:  Because,  you  know,  like  our,  not  housing  benefit  but  you  know  like-­‐  
Scott:  No,  we’re  the  biggest  givers  in  the  world.  
Nicole:  The  dole,  because  we  cannot  actually  take  the  dole  away  because  of  the  EU  
rules.    
[Discussion  continues  about  whether  the  EU  dictates  national  policies  or  not]  
Julie:  Some  of  the  rules  and  regulations  have  come  into  force  because  they  are  EU.  In  
my  industry,  there  are  certain  things  that  we  have  to  do  because  it’s  part  of  the  EU.  
Scott:  Yeah,  what  are  they  then,  Julie?    Safety  things?  Making  sure  you’ve  got  fire  
alarms?    Great  idea.  Who  would  go  and  vote  against  that?  
Nicole:  It’s  common  sense  though,  isn’t  it?  Why  can’t  we  write  our  own  laws  
ourselves?  (FG3)  
  
The  extract  above  comes  from  a  mixed  focus  group  that  included  participants  intending  to  
vote  both  Leave  and  Remain.  The  extract  starts  with  a  discussion  about  welfare  benefits  and  
Nicole,  who  intended  to  vote  Leave,  argues  against  the  abuse  of  social  welfare  (‘getting  off  
the  government’)  by  people  who  should  be  in  work  and  are  not  really  poor  (‘perceived  
poverty’).  This  argument  is  quite  common  in  Britain  and  it  is  frequently  directed  against  
people  on  benefits,  migrants  and  against  governments  that  are  seen  as  being  ‘too  soft’,  as  
Scott  alludes  to  (‘we’re  the  biggest  givers  in  the  world’).  This  idea  was  salient  in  this  focus  
group,  which  consisted  of  participants  who  were  self-­‐employed  and  particularly  work-­‐
oriented.  In  this  extract,  Nicole  is  using  the  commonplace  (c.f.  Billig,  1987)  of  welfare  abuse  
to  argue  against  the  EU  which  is  presented  as  dictating  these  policies.  The  conversation  
continues  about  whether  or  not  the  EU  does  indeed  dictate  such  policies.  Towards  the  end,  
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Scott  suggests  that  EU  rules  are  about  minor  and  non-­‐political  matters,  such  as  health  and  
safety  regulations.  Nicole,  however,  counters  this  point  by  making  an  appeal  to  common-­‐
sense.  She  argues  that  it  is  simply  ‘common-­‐sense’  to  ‘write  our  own  laws’,  irrespective  of  
the  magnitude  of  the  law,  and  this  settles  the  discussion.  Thus,  the  actual  effect  of  EU  laws  
is  presented  as  beside  the  point;  what  is  presented  as  important  and  beyond  doubt  is  the  
value  of  national  self-­‐determination  in  itself.    
Such  pro-­‐Leave  arguments  could  be  construed  and  delegitimised  as  prejudiced,  in  line  with  
the  norm  against  prejudice.  This  is  not  surprising  given  that  Brexit  has  been  commonly  
associated  with  prejudice  and  xenophobia  in  public  and  academic  discussions.  Accusing  
Leave  voters  of  prejudice  is  a  culturally  available  line  of  argument  that  can  be  easily  
mobilised  in  discussions  about  Brexit.  In  our  data,  a  counter-­‐argument  to  pro-­‐Brexit  
sovereignty  arguments  was  frequently  encapsulated  in  the  ‘little  England’  trope.  Using  this  
trope,  pro-­‐Leave  positions  could  be  dismissed  as  narrow-­‐minded,  outdated  and  xenophobic,  
as  the  extract  below  from  a  Remain  group  shows.    
Extract  3  
Rob:  He  [Gove]  and  Boris  Johnson  are  just…  [They]  are  just  incoherent,  bumbling,  
irrational.  I  want  a  cool,  calm,  logical  ‘out’  argument  and  I’ve  never  heard  it.  
Leslie:  I  get  the  feeling  that  people  who  want  to  get  out,  it’s  all  on  emotion  rather  than  
logic.  
Nick:  Yeah.  
Interviewer:  So,  what  lies  at  the  base  of  the  heart-­‐  
Leslie:  The  wish  to,  as  they  say,  take  control  
Rob:  ‘Little  England’  attitude.  
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Leslie:  To  be  ‘Little  England’.  
Nick:  Immigrants  is  a  big  thing,  you  know,  full  stop.  
Leslie:  Close  our  borders,  immigrants  is  a  big  thing.    (FG1)      
  
In  the  extract  above,  Rob  and  Leslie  build  up  a  distinction  between  rationality  and  emotion  
to  suggest  that  Leave  voters  are  driven  by  emotion,  rather  than  logic.  The  dichotomy  
between  ‘hot’  emotion  and  ‘cold’  reason  in  this  context  (what  Rob  refers  to  as  ‘cool,  calm,  
logical  ‘out’  argument’)  positions  Leave  voters  as  violating  the  principle  of  rational  thinking  
that  is  so  highly  valued  in  Western  liberal  democracies  like  Britain.  With  some  prompting  
from  the  interviewer,  Rob  and  Leslie  mention  ‘taking  back  control’  and  having  a  ‘Little  
England  attitude’  as  the  elements  that  make  up  this  irrational  Leave  position.  Nick  agrees  
and  elaborates  further  by  bringing  in  the  issue  of  immigration  as  the  determining  factor  
behind  the  Leave  position  (‘Immigrants  is  a  big  thing,  you  know,  full-­‐stop’),  with  which  Leslie  
agrees.  Nick  and  Leslie  do  not  articulate  what  they  mean  by  immigration  being  a  ‘big  thing’,  
which  suggests  that  the  relationship  between  Leave  voting  and  anti-­‐immigration  prejudice  is  
taken  as  a  given  and  does  not  require  further  explanation.    
In  this  context,  supporting  Leave  can  become  accountable  as  a  potentially  prejudiced  
position  and  it  can  prompt  identity  management  concerns.  This  is  shown  in  the  extract  
below:  
Extract  4  
Mandy:  …  I  don’t  think  of  Europe  as  being  -­‐  I  certainly  don’t  feel  it  like  family.    I  think  
that  it  is  still  very  segregated….  
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Interviewer:  Do  you  feel  that  you  identify  with  being  a  European?  Or  is  it  -­‐  are  we  
British  or  English?  
Mandy:  I  don’t  feel  British  in  the  sense  that  I  think  -­‐  you  know  how  some  people  are  
very  patriotic.  I  don’t  feel  like  that.  I  take  from  other  countries  some  of  the  things  -­‐  
some  of  their  cultures.  I  like  some  of  their  cultures.  I  think  being  able  to  travel,  we're  
fortunate  that  we  are  able  to  -­‐  we've  seen  further  afield  and  we're  able  to  bring  all  
those  different  elements,  be  it  America  -­‐  because  every  country  has  good  and  bad  
points.    But  I  don’t  stand  and  think,  oh,  Britain  first.  (FG9)  
     
During  this  mixed  focus  group,  Mandy  had  expressed  her  intention  to  vote  to  leave  the  EU  
on  the  basis  that  Britain  would  be  better  off  by  deciding  its  own  laws  and  controlling  
immigration.  Mandy  and  others  in  the  group  also  criticised  nationalism  (using  the  example  
of  Scottish  nationalism)  for  breeding  tensions  and  they  supported  international  
collaboration  and  intercultural  exchange.  The  extract  above  is  an  example  of  Mandy  
navigating  this  dilemma  between  safeguarding  national  distinctiveness  and  being  open  to  
international  exchange.  In  particular,  Mandy  argues  that  she  does  not  see  Europe  as  a  
‘family’  but  as  being  ‘segregated’.  In  response  to  the  interviewer’s  either/or  question  about  
whether  she  identifies  with  being  European  or  being  British  or  English,  Mandy  disclaims  a  
‘very  patriotic’  British  identity  which  would  make  her  vulnerable  to  potential  accusations  of  
nationalistic  prejudice  (see  Condor,  2000).  She  manages  these  accountability  concerns  by  
arguing  in  favour  intercultural  exchange  (‘I  take  from  other  countries  some  of  the  things  -­‐  
some  of  their  cultures’)  and  by  presenting  a  balanced  argument  about  every  country  having  
‘good  and  bad  points’.  In  the  end  of  the  extract,  Mandy  reinstates  her  point  about  not  being  
nationalistic  (‘I  don’t  stand  and  think,  oh,  Britain  first’).  Such  accountability  concerns  against  
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being  seen  as  prejudiced  when  voting  Leave  may  have  been  particularly  prominent  at  the  
time  this  focus  group  was  conducted.  This  was  five  days  after  Jo  Cox  (a  pro-­‐EU  Labour  MP)  
was  murdered  by  a  white  supremacist.  Mandy’s  use  of  words  is  indicative:  ‘Britain  first’  are  
the  same  words  that  Thomas  Mair,  Jo  Cox’s  killer,  shouted  before  killing  her.        
As  is  alluded  by  the  term  ‘dilemma’,  the  ideological  distinction  between  national  
particularism  and  internationalism  is  not  an  either/or  matter  of  siding  with  one  side  or  the  
other.  Rather,  people  as  ‘argumentative  thinkers’  (Billig,  1987)  orient  themselves  towards  
both  sides,  mobilising  arguments  and  counter-­‐arguments  in  their  accounts.  Identity  
management  was  thus  not  just  a  concern  for  participants  intending  to  vote  Leave  who  could  
be  seen  as  prejudiced.  Participants  intending  to  vote  Remain  could  also  be  potentially  seen  
as  not  respecting  the  value  of  national  self-­‐determination  and  putting  foreign  interests  
above  national  sovereignty  and  integrity.  
Extract  5  
Sarah:  Well,  I  think  the  European  is  about  culture  and  people  and  belonging.    With  the  
EU,  it’s  for  me,  it’s  a  trade  organisation.  
Jessica:  It’s  the  trade,  economics.  
Sarah:  I  don’t  want  to  personally  be  involved  in  the  EU  for  anything  else  but  trade.    But  
with  trade  comes  so  many  other  things.  So,  like  all  the  directives  about  how  things  
should  be  produced,  and  tariffs,  and  health  and  safety  aspects  of  products,  and  the  
free  movement  of  people.  That’s  all  part  of  trade.  I  don’t  expect  them  to  interfere  
with  any  of  our  laws.    
Jessica:  So  that’s  the  EU.     
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Interviewer:  Yeah.    And  you’re  okay  with  all  of  that,  you  know,  having  to  carry  that  
baggage  as  it  were.  
Sarah:  I  just  think  we’ve  got  to  the  stage  where  we  are  in  it  so  deeply.  And  yes,  I  
absolutely  appreciate  that  the  people  who  voted  to  come  in  in  ’75,  which  I  wasn’t  one  
of  them,  I  think  they  signed  up  for  something  and  it’s  changed.  And  I’m  no  fan  of  the  
EU  and  I  don’t  think  many  Brits  are  particularly  happy  with  the  EU.  But  with  a  
pragmatic  head  on,  it’s  the  trade  and  the  economy  element.  (FG4)  
  
The  extract  above  comes  from  a  small  focus  group,  with  only  two  participants  who  both  
intended  to  vote  Remain.  During  the  discussion  both  participants  appeared  Eurosceptic  
arguing  against  further  EU  integration.  The  extract  above  follows  from  a  discussion  of  
whether,  and  to  what  extent,  the  UK  is  part  of  Europe,  where  the  participants  argued  that  
they  felt  culturally  more  Western  (and  closer  to  Australia  and  America)  than  European.  In  
his  context,  Sarah  argued  that  the  UK  is  ‘more  part  of  the  EU  rather  than  Europe’.  At  the  
very  beginning  of  the  quote  above,  Sarah  distinguishes  between  culture  and  trade  and  then  
between  trade  and  national  legislation.  According  to  this  line  of  argument,  developed  by  
Sarah  and  endorsed  by  Jessica,  the  UK  should  only  be  European  in  terms  of  trade  but  not  in  
terms  of  its  culture  and  its  politics  (‘I  don’t  expect  them  to  interfere  with  any  of  our  laws’).  
With  prompting  from  the  interviewer  to  explain  her  position,  Sarah  argues  that  Remain  is  
the  pragmatic  option,  suggesting  that  it  is  not  an  emotionally  invested  choice  (‘I’m  no  fan  of  
the  EU’).  Here  again,  as  in  Extract  3,  the  distinction  between  pragmatism  and  reason,  on  the  
one  hand,  and  emotion,  on  the  other  hand,  is  mobilised  to  argue,  albeit  reluctantly,  in  
favour  of  the  EU.  We  suggest  here  that  the  phrase  ‘I’m  no  fan  of  the  EU,  but…’  functions  as  a  
disclaimer.  Disclaimers  have  been  mostly  discussed  in  discursive  analyses  of  immigration  
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talk  as  rhetorical  strategies  that  enable  speakers  to  appear  non-­‐prejudiced  when  they  argue  
against  immigration  (e.g.  ‘I’m  not  racist,  but’).  As  we  saw  in  Extract  4,  such  accountability  
concerns  were  indeed  present  in  the  talk  of  participants  intending  to  vote  Leave  in  our  
sample.  What  Extract  5  further  shows  is  that,  in  the  context  of  Brexit,  an  additional  
accountability  concern  seems  to  be  at  play:  not  appearing  as  too  Europhile  in  a  way  that  
appears  to  disrespect  the  valued  principle  of  national  self-­‐determination.  
Like  in  the  focus  group  above,  several  other  groups  made  a  distinction  between  an  
economic  and  a  political  union;  the  former  seen  as  beneficial  for  Britain  and  the  latter  being  
seen  as  too  interventionist.  While  Leave-­‐supporting  accounts  tended  to  not  make  a  
distinction  between  an  economic  and  a  political  European  union  but  argued  against  the  EU  
as  a  whole,  in  Remain-­‐supporting  accounts  this  distinction  was  used  to  argue  for  both  
political  sovereignty  and  for  the  benefits  of  an  economic  union.  In  other  words,  the  
distinction  between  politics  and  the  economy  helped  to  navigate  the  dilemma  between  
national  sovereignty  and  international  engagement,  as  is  the  case  of  Extract  5.  Another  
observation  that  can  be  made  here  is  that  the  economy  appears  to  be  associated  with  
pragmatism  and  with  rational  cost-­‐benefit  calculations.  In  the  next  section,  we  show  that  
this  representation  of  the  economy  is  juxtaposed  to  the  sphere  of  politics,  which  is  
constructed  as  prone  to  bias.  
Politics  and  the  economy  
In  addition  to  the  ideological  dilemma  between  national  particularism  and  internationalism  
that  was  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  our  analysis  also  points  to  another  important  
ideological  tension  that  grounded  participants’  accounts  about  the  EU  referendum.  This  was  
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a  distinction  between  the  supposed  cold  logic  of  the  market  against  the  corruption  and  bias  
of  the  political  sphere.  
The  idea  that  politics  are  corrupt  and  that  politicians  are  not  to  be  trusted  was  very  common  
in  the  data  across  political  orientation  and  voting  intention.  As  has  been  noted  by  others  in  
the  wake  of  the  Brexit  result  (e.g.  Goodwin  &  Heath,  2016),  our  focus  groups  point  to  a  
sense  of  disillusionment  with  the  political  establishment,  what  can  also  be  understood  as  a  
broader  crisis  of  political  representation  (Koch,  2017).  This  took  different  forms  in  our  data.  
Participants  intending  to  vote  Remain,  for  instance,  were  particularly  concerned  about  what  
they  saw  as  the  rise  of  right-­‐wing  populism  against  values  of  tolerance  and  respect  for  
diversity  in  Brexit-­‐supporting  political  rhetoric.  Participants  intending  to  vote  Leave  also  
stressed  their  lack  of  trust  in  politicians  with  specific  reference  to  austerity  policies  and  
National  Health  Service  (NHS)  cuts,  but  also  more  generally,  by  arguing  against  a  corrupt  
political  establishment.  That  politicians  lie  for  personal  and  political  gains  was  almost  
commonplace  across  the  dataset.  Below  are  two  examples  of  this  mistrust  of  politics  (see  
also  Capelos  &  Katsanidou,  this  issue,  and  Rico  &  Guinjoan,  this  issue,  on  public  frustration  
and  mistrust  towards  politics).  The  first  comes  from  a  group  intending  to  vote  Remain  and  
the  second  from  a  mixed  group.    
Extract  6    
Rob:  The  sad  fact  is  that  everybody  arguing  for  ‘out’  has  got  a  personal  agenda.  
Nick:  Yeah.  
Leslie:  Well,  how  else  can  you  vote?  You  can’t  just  –  
Rob:  Boris  is  not  leading  the  ‘out’  campaign  because  he  wants  us  out.  He’s  leading  it  
because  he  wants  to  be  Prime  Minister.  
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Linda:  He’s  leading  the  ‘Boris  wants  to  be  in  charge’  campaign.  (FG1)  
  
Extract  7  
Nicole:  I  feel  a  little  bit  like  just  throwing  my  toys  out  the  pram,  because  I’m  just  so  
annoyed  with  the  politicians.  And  specifically,  this  campaign  to  stay  in,  and  just  the  
stuff  that  they  say.    I  think,  do  you  think  we’re  stupid?      
Interviewer:  What  sort  of  things  are  they  saying  then?  
Nicole:  Just  loads  of  stuff,  all  this  emergency  budget  and  like,  other  people  saying  it’s  
illegal.    And  there’s  no…    They  haven’t,  if  they  came  and  said,  ‘right,  so  we’re  in  the  EU  
and  this  is  what  the  EU  is  put  into  our  country  this  year  or  in  general’  and  ‘this  is  
what…    Look  at  this  amazing  project  they’ve  done  and  look  at  this,  what  they’ve  done  
here.”    And,  ‘we  take  this  EU  money  and  we  do  this  with  it’.    But  why  don’t  they  do  
that?    Why,  if  they’ve  got  all  these  facts  and  figures,  why  aren’t  they?    
Gina:  They’re  not  telling  you,  is  that  what  you  mean?    
Nicole:  Yeah,  and  I  think,  well  if  you’re  not  telling  me  and  all  you’re  trying  to  do  is  just  
scaremonger  continually,  then  I  don’t  trust  you.  And  that’s  basically  why  I’m  going  to  
vote  out.  (FG3)  
  
In  Extract  6,  the  focus  group  participants  argue  that  Boris  Johnson,  a  leading  Conservative  
Leave  campaigner  is  leading  the  ‘out’  campaign  to  pursue  his  personal  interest  in  becoming  
Prime  Minister.  In  Extract  7  Nicole,  who  was  intending  to  vote  Leave,  says  that  she  is  
‘annoyed  with  the  politicians’  because  they  act  as  if  they  think  the  public  are  ‘stupid’.  With  
prompting  from  the  interviewer  and  from  Gina,  another  participant,  Nicole  expresses  a  
grievance  with  politicians  who  try  to  manipulate  voters  into  voting  Remain.  She  refers  to  the  
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emergency  budget1  and  to  the  general  tendency  of  politicians,  particularly  Remain-­‐
supporting  ones,  to  withhold  information  from  the  public  (which  would  enable  them  to  
make  informed  decisions)  and  to  try  instead  to  scaremonger  voters  (see  also  Andreouli,  
Kaposi  &  Stenner,  for  further  analysis  of  this  focus  group).  The  data  overall  indicated  a  sense  
of  anti-­‐politics  on  behalf  of  the  participants.  Participants  did  not  argue  that  politics  are  not  
important,  at  least  not  with  regards  to  the  particular  issue  at  hand,  but  they  often  suggested  
that  politics  are  actually  harmful.    
Contrary  to  that,  the  economy  was  very  often  seen  as  a  sphere  of  reason  and  pragmatic  
decision-­‐making.  As  argued  in  the  introduction  of  this  paper,  in  so-­‐called  ‘econocracies’,  the  
economy  is  seen  as  a  the  most  important  factor  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  political  
decision  making.  In  our  data,  participants  commonly  tried  to  support  their  arguments  for  
and  against  EU  membership  by  mobilising  economy-­‐based  backings.  As  the  extract  below  
from  a  mixed  group  illustrates,  economic  arguments  were  presented  as  neutral  and  rational  
against  the  bias  and  irrationality  of  politics.    
Extract  8  
Julie:  Can  I  just  say,  I  think  the  bestest  [sic]  person  to  have  spoken  out  about  either  
staying  in  or  out  of  the  EU…  is  actually  Carney,  the  Bank  of  England  man.  Because  he’s  
not  influenced    
Interviewer:  So,  he  doesn’t  represent  a  political  party.  
Julie:  He  is  just  a  number  cruncher.     
                                                                                                                          
1  George  Osborne,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  at  the  time  of  the  EU  referendum,  released  what  he  called  
an  ‘emergency  budget’  which  would  be  used  in  the  case  of  a  Leave  vote.  This  announcement  was  seen  by  
some  as  evidence  of  the  economic  risks  of  Brexit  and  by  others  as  an  attempt  to  scaremonger  voters  into  
voting  Remain.  Following  the  Brexit  vote,  Osborne  was  sacked  from  his  position  by  the  new  Prime  Minister  
Teresa  May.  The  emergency  budget  was  never  implemented.  
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Sam:  And  what  has  he  said?  
Julie:  He  has  said  that  we  should  stay  in.    And  he’s  got  a  very  good  case,  a  good  case  
forward  about  the  reasons  about  staying  in  and  it’s  all,  you  know,  monetary.  You’ve  
got  to  have  a  little  bit  of  faith  in  somebody,  out  of  all  the  politicians  saying  this  and  
that,  whatever.  But  he  is,  24/7,  he  is  a  number  cruncher.  (FG3)    
  
The  extract  above  challenges  the  idea  that  people  are  ‘fed  up  with  experts’  (as  was  famously  
stated  by  Michael  Gove,  a  Conservative  MP  and  leading  Leave  campaigner).  Rather,  
participants  were  concerned  with  identifying  the  facts  within  a  very  fragmented  and  
mistrusted  political  field.  The  extract  above  illustrates  the  juxtaposition  between  economic  
expertise  and  political  bias  in  our  data.  Julie  argues  that  Mick  Carney,  the  director  of  the  
Bank  of  England,  is  the  ‘bestest’  [sic]  person  to  have  spoken  out  about  the  referendum.  Julie  
argues  that  this  is  because  ‘he’s  not  influenced’  (by  a  political  party)  and  because  he  is  a  
‘number  cruncher’.    This  constructs  an  image  of  Carney  as  a  neutral  advisor  who  has  no  
political  interests  in  this  matter.  His  advice  is  presented  as  based  on  ‘monetary’  
considerations  which  are  assumed  to  be  objective.  For  this  reason,  Julie  concludes  that  she  
can  trust  him.  This  is  juxtaposed  with  politicians  whose  statements  are  dismissively  referred  
to  as  ‘this  and  that,  whatever’,  suggesting  that  they  cannot  be  trusted.  So,  while  an  
economist’s  perspective  is  presented  as  neutral  and  rational,  politicians  are  presented  as  
biased.  This  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  well-­‐researched  ideological  dilemma  
between  reason  and  prejudice.  In  the  context  of  these  focus  groups,  this  dilemma  appears  
to  take  the  form  of  an  opposition  between  the  economy,  as  a  sphere  of  reasoned  decision  
making,  and  politics,  as  a  sphere  prone  to  bias  and  instrumentalism.    
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The  following  extract  comes  from  a  mixed  focus  group:  
Extract  9  
Mark:  The  way  I  feel  the  media  has  portrayed  it  along  the  lines  of,  if  you  are  intelligent  
and  sophisticated  you  will  vote  Remain;  if  you're  a  bit  stupid  and  uneducated  you'll  
vote  to  leave…  One  media  listed  all  these  people.  Look  at  these  brilliant  academics.  
We've  got  this  banker,  this  investment  banker,  we've  got  this  politician,  this  politician  
is…  
Philippa:  Versus  Trump  and  Nigel  Farage.  
Mark:    Who's  on  this  side?  Farage  and  Boris  Johnson….  
Jim:  Michael  Howard  was  really  good  on  telly  the  other  day.  I  was  quite  impressed  
with  him.  
Interviewer:  What  was  he  saying?  
Jim:    I  can't  remember  what  he  was  saying,  but  to  be  fair  to  him,  it  was  a  really  
balanced  view…    I  thought  he  was  quite  clever.  
Mandy:  And  that  man  I  was  listening  to  the  other  day.  
Jim:  Oh,  I  liked  him.  
Mandy:  The  financial  chap.  I  don’t  know  him.  
Jim:    Fifty-­‐three  years  in  the…  
Mandy:    Fifty-­‐three  he'd  been  a…  
Jim:  In  the  City.    (FG9)  
  
The  participants  above  are  well  aware  that  Leave  voters  have  been  represented  as  bigoted.  
Mark,  who  is  undecided,  makes  reference  to  the  media  depiction  of  Remain  voters  as  
‘intelligent’  and  ‘sophisticated’  and  of  Leave  voters  as  ‘stupid’  and  ‘uneducated’.  He  also  
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refers  to  a  specific  programme  that  listed  ‘brilliant’  academics  and  an  investment  banker  as  
supporters  of  Remain.  Philippa,  who  supports  Remain,  complements  Mark’s  point  by  
drawing  what  is  presented  as  an  unfavourable  comparison  between  supporters  of  Remain  
and  Leave-­‐supporting  politicians  (specifically  Trump  and  Farage,  and  then  Boris  Johnson  by  
Mark).  As  in  the  previous  extract,  the  economy  is  juxtaposed  to  politics:  the  Remain-­‐
supporting  investment  banker  is  positioned  against  untrustworthy  politicians.  This  prompts  
a  response  by  Jim  and  Mandy  who  intended  to  vote  Leave.  They  bring  in  the  discussion  the  
views  of  esteemed  Leave  supporters,  first  a  politician,  Michael  Howard,  and  then  a  City  
financier.  In  line  with  our  argument  about  the  distinction  between  economy  and  politics,  the  
expertise  of  the  City  financier  is  evidenced  in  the  very  nature  of  his  work  (having  worked  for  
fifty-­‐three  years  in  the  City),  while  the  credentials  of  Michael  Howard  do  not  simply  stem  
from  his  service  but  need  to  be  built  up  (Jim  argues  that  he  is  clever  and  balanced).    
Discussion  
Following  the  UK  EU  referendum  of  June  2016,  several  explanatory  frameworks  have  been  
put  forward  to  explain  the  Brexit  vote,  which  went  against  mainstream  political  party  lines  
and  was,  arguably,  evidence  of  a  disconnection  between  citizens  and  political  authorities.  
Analyses  of  the  Brexit  vote  have  focused  on  identifying  the  differences  between  ‘Remainers’  
and  ‘Brexiters’  in  terms  of  their  demographics  and  also  in  terms  of  their  social  values,  with  
(several  versions  of)  the  distinction  between  communitarianism  and  cosmopolitanism  being  
employed  to  explain  new  political  orientations.  In  this  paper,  we  have  drawn  on  these  ideas,  
but  we  have  also  have  highlighted  the  intersections  across  ideological  themes  in  lay  political  
thinking  about  Brexit  by  employing  a  discursively-­‐oriented  qualitative  approach.  
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Our  study  consists  of  nine  focus  groups,  conducted  across  England  with  participants  
intending  to  vote  Leave,  Remain  and  some  undecided,  in  the  few  weeks  preceding  the  vote  
in  June  2016.  We  do  not  claim  that  our  empirical  findings  can  be  generalised  to  the  entire  
population  of  England  or  the  UK.  But,  by  examining  in  depth  the  intricacies  of  lay  political  
reasoning  towards  Brexit,  our  work  adds  a  much-­‐needed  layer  of  complexity  to  existing  
research  in  this  field.  Understanding  citizens’  perspectives  both  in  their  breadth  and  in  their  
depth  is  key  for  gaining  insights  into  the  shifts  and  changes  of  political  positioning  in  the  
volatile  context  of  Brexit.  
Our  study  illustrates  how  ideological  themes  associated  with  (neo-­‐)liberalism  and  
nationalism  are  entangled  to  produce  complex  ideological  narratives  (see  also,  Gibson’s  
(2016)  discussion  of  the  links  between  American  nationalism  and  capitalist  ideology).  Our  
findings  also  suggest  that,  contrary  to  the  polarising  rhetoric  that  has  emerged  around  the  
referendum  (e.g.  ‘the  people’  and  ‘the  elites’),  citizens’  ideological  positioning  is  much  more  
complex  and  entwined  than  is  commonly  assumed.    
In  our  analysis,  we  found  that  the  ideological  dilemma  between  protecting  national  
distinctiveness  and  sovereignty,  on  the  one  hand,  and  being  open  to  international  
collaboration  and  exchange,  on  the  other  hand,  was  an  organising  principle  in  participants’  
accounts.  The  value  of  cosmopolitanism,  in  terms  of  diversity,  intercultural  exchange  and  
cooperation,  was  important  in  arguments  supporting  the  UK’s  continuing  membership  of  
the  European  Union.  Conversely,  preserving  national  sovereignty  against  European  
interventionism,  in  terms  of  controlling  national  legislation  and  borders,  was  the  most  
salient  theme  of  Leave-­‐supporting  accounts.    
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These  positions  were  not  mutually  exclusive.  Our  data  show  that  participants  intending  to  
vote  Leave  and  Remain,  as  well  as  undecided  participants,  all  oriented  themselves  towards  
both  sides  of  the  argument.  This  was  evident  in  how  participants  navigated  the  ideological  
dilemma  between  the  value  of  protecting  the  nation  against  foreign  influence  and  the  value  
of  international  openness.  For  participants  intending  to  vote  Leave,  appearing  non-­‐
nationalistic  was  a  key  concern.  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  widespread  assumption  that  
Brexit  is  associated  with  prejudice.  In  order  to  abide  by  the  norm  against  prejudice,  Leave  
supporting  accounts  were  often  interweaved  with  rhetorical  attempts  to  establish  liberal  
identity  credentials.    
While  presenting  oneself  as  tolerant  was  rhetorically  easier  for  participants  supporting  
Remain,  other  types  of  identity  stakes  emerged  in  these  accounts.  In  particular,  a  concern  
over  protecting  national  sovereignty  was  not  only  evident  in  Leave-­‐supporting  accounts  but  
also  in  Remain-­‐supporting  ones.  In  their  efforts  not  to  appear  as  disrespecting  the  value  of  
national  sovereignty,  participants  intending  to  vote  Remain  presented  Remain  as  the  
pragmatic  choice,  based  on  the  demands  of  the  economy  only,  and  not  as  an  emotional  or  
identitarian  choice.  Our  analysis  suggests  that,  in  addition  to  the  well-­‐researched  
disclaimers  against  potential  accusations  of  prejudice  (e.g.  ‘I’m  not  racist  but’),  in  the  
context  of  Brexit  discussions,  a  type  of  ‘I’m  not  a  fan  of  the  EU,  but’  disclaimer  also  emerges.  
While  the  former  seeks  to  establish  liberal  identity  credentials  for  speakers,  the  latter  seeks  
to  inoculate  speakers  from  accusations  of  disrespecting  the  highly  valued  principle  of  
national  sovereignty.  In  these  latter  accounts,  the  economy  was  foregrounded  as  the  sphere  
of  neural  cost-­‐benefit  calculations,  according  to  which  remaining  in  the  EU  was  the  sound  
thing  to  do.  Nevertheless,  these  participants  were  clear  that  the  EU-­‐UK  economic  union  
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should  not  extend  to  UK  politics.  The  separation  between  politics  and  the  economy  as  two  
distinct  spheres  thus  enabled  participants  to  navigate  the  dilemmas  of  nationalism.  
The  separation  between  politics  and  the  economy  can  be  understood  as  an  instance  of  
everyday  neoliberalism  or  neoliberal  common-­‐sense  (Hall  &  O’Shea,  2015).  As  was  argued  in  
the  introduction  of  this  paper,  contemporary  liberal  democracies  are  characterised  by  the  
widespread  assumption  that  the  economy  is  a  neutral,  a-­‐political  sphere  of  activity.  In  this  
context,  reason  is  not  only  evidenced  by  the  absence  of  prejudice,  as  has  been  eloquently  
shown  in  Billig  and  colleagues’  (1988)  analyses  of  liberal  ideology;  it  also  takes  the  form  of  
the  naturalisation  of  economic  self-­‐interest  as  common-­‐sensical  and  un-­‐objectionable.  On  
the  basis  of  our  analysis,  we  suggest  that  the  ideological  opposition  between  reason  and  
bias,  central  in  liberal  thinking  (Billig  et  al.,  1988),  appears  to  be  rearticulated  into  an  
opposition  between  the  economy  and  politics  in  the  context  of  neoliberalism,  and  
particularly  with  regards  to  the  political  debates  of  the  EU  referendum  in  the  UK.  Reason  
thus  becomes  associated  with  the  supposed  merits  of  a  market-­‐oriented  logic  and  bias  
becomes  associated  with  the  supposed  shortcomings  of  political  and  ideological  thinking.    
Separating  the  economy  from  politics  and,  at  the  same  time,  elevating  economic  issues  as  
the  most  important  issues  in  political  decision-­‐making  have  the  double  effect  of  
depoliticising  the  economy  and  side-­‐lining  political  values  and  ideologies  as  irrelevant,  even  
harmful,  to  politics.  This  creates  fertile  ground  for  a  supposed  non-­‐ideological  populism  
which  claims  to  speak  in  terms  of  a  ‘reasonable’  common-­‐sense  against  the  political  
establishment.  This  was,  for  example,  a  key  element  of  Trump’s  Presidential  campaign  (see  
Reicher  &  Portice,  this  issue,  on  how  political  leaders  seek  to  gain  popular  support  by  
mobilising  antagonisms,  e.g.  against  migrants).  Nevertheless,  while  right-­‐wing  populism  has  
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gained  momentum,  the  left  also  appears  emboldened  in  many  countries  of  the  West,  with  
disaffected  citizens  turning  to  more  radical  left-­‐wing  parties  and  candidates  (such  as  Corbyn  
in  the  UK).  In  this  context,  some  scholars  have  argued  that  we  may  be  witnessing  the  end  of  
the  ideological  hegemony  of  neoliberalism  (Streeck,  2017),  which  has  characterised  the  
political  centre  for  the  past  few  decades.  Hence,  while  our  analysis  points  to  the  persistence  
of  the  ideologies  of  nationalism  and  (neo-­‐)liberalism  in  lay  political  thinking,  it  is  imperative  
that  we  remain  open  to  the  possibility  of  the  emergence  of  new  political  ideas  in  these  
particularly  volatile  times.  
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